区块链背景下农产品零售市场价格博弈模型与竞争策略

doi:10.12133/j.smartag.SA202309027

Smart Agriculture ›› 2024, Vol. 6 ›› Issue (4): 160-173.doi: 10.12133/j.smartag.SA202309027

• 信息处理与决策 • 上一篇

区块链背景下农产品零售市场价格博弈模型与竞争策略

薛冰¹^,²^,³, 孙传恒²(), 刘双印¹^,³, 罗娜², 李金辉²

^1. 广州市农产品质量安全溯源信息技术重点实验室，广东广州 510225，中国
^2. 国家农业信息化工程技术研究中心，北京 100097，中国
^3. 仲恺农业工程学院信息科学与技术学院，广东广州 510225，中国

收稿日期:2023-09-25 出版日期:2024-07-30
基金项目:
“十四五”国家重点研发计划项目(2022YFD2001804)
作者简介:
薛冰，研究方向为农产品区块链溯源、供应链管理。E-mail：1277463828@qq.com
通信作者:
孙传恒，博士，研究员，研究方向为区块链、农产品溯源、农业工程、电子信息。E-mail：sunch@nercita.org.cn

Price Game Model and Competitive Strategy of Agricultural Products Retail Market in the Context of Blockchain

XUE Bing¹^,²^,³, SUN Chuanheng²(), LIU Shuangyin¹^,³, LUO Na², LI Jinhui²

^1. Guangzhou Key Laboratory of Information Technology for Quality and Safety Traceability of Agricultural Products, Guangzhou 510225, China
^2. National Research Center of Agricultural Information Engineering Technology, Beijing 10097, China
^3. College of Information Science and Technology, Zhongkai University of Agriculture and Engineering, Guangzhou 510225, China

Received:2023-09-25 Online:2024-07-30
Foundation items:National Key Research and Development Program of China(2022YFD2001804)
About author:
XUE Bing, E-mail: 1277463828@qq.com
Corresponding author:
SUN Chuanheng, E-mail: sunch@nercita.org.cn

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

[目的/意义] 区块链本质上是一个共享数据库，存储的数据是不可篡改、公开和透明的，应用在农产品供应链上可以提高产品透明度，吸引更多的消费者，但也会存在消费者隐私担忧问题。消费者的隐私担忧程度影响着农产品零售商对于是否售卖区块链溯源农产品的决策。通过研究区块链溯源对农产品零售商竞争策略、定价和最优决策的影响，零售商可以根据自己的市场情况制定市场竞争策略，提高自己的竞争力，优化农产品供应链。 [方法] 基于纳什均衡及Stackelberg博弈理论，建立初始农产品零售商与新进零售商的价格博弈模型，研究分析农产品零售商之间的竞争决策，利用区块链智能合约技术将博弈过程以及对应情况写入智能合约，保障合作博弈有效进行，将博弈结果上链来规范博弈双方的合作行为。 [结果和讨论] 消费者隐私担忧问题会影响农产品的价格和利润。此外，通过对两家农产品零售商均衡策略的研究，发现当消费者隐私担忧程度较低、信息透明度较高时，两家零售商才会同时售卖区块链溯源产品；消费者隐私担忧程度和信息透明度处于中等水平时，消费者对初始零售商的信任度更高，使其可以承担更高的隐私担忧成本，而新进零售商会被挤出市场。 [结论] 从利益层面上讲，区块链溯源农产品并不总是适用于零售商，结合自身实际条件才能做出最优的决策选择。良性的合作博弈才能使利益最大化，优化农产品供应链整体利益水平。

关键词: 区块链, 供应链, 农产品零售商, 消费者隐私, 博弈论

Abstract:

[Objective] In the retail market for agricultural products, consumers are increasingly concerned about the safety and health aspects of those products. Traceability of blockchain has emerged as a crucial solution to address these concerns. Essentially, a blockchain functions as a dynamic, distributed, and shared database. When implemented in the agricultural supply chain, it not only improves product transparency to attract more consumers but also raises concerns about consumer privacy disclosure. The level of consumer apprehension regarding privacy will directly influence their choice to purchase agricultural products traced through blockchain-traced. Moreover, retailers' choices to sell blockchain-traced produce are influenced by consumer privacy concerns. By analyzing the impact of blockchain technology on the competitive strategies, pricing, and decision-making among agricultural retailers, they can develop market competition strategies that suit their market conditions to bolster their competitiveness and optimize the agricultural supply chain to maximize overall benefits. [Methods] Based on Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg game theory, a market competition model was developed to analyze the interactions between existing and new agricultural product retailers. The competitive strategies adopted by agricultural product retailers were analyzed under four different options of whether two agricultural retailers sell blockchain agricultural products. It delved into product utility, optimal pricing, demand, and profitability for each retailer under these different scenarios. How consumer privacy concerns impact pricing and profits of two agricultural product retailers and the optimal response strategy choice of another retailer when the competitor made the decision choice first were also analyzed. This analysis aimed to guide agricultural product retailers in making strategic choices that would safeguard their profits and market positions. To address the cooperative game problem of agricultural product retailers in market competition, ensure that retailers could better cooperate in the game, blockchain smart contract technology was used. By encoding the process and outcomes of the Stackelberg game into smart contracts, retailers could input their specific variables and receive tailored strategy recommendations. Uploading game results onto the blockchain network ensured transparency and encouraged cooperative behavior among retailers. By using the characteristics of blockchain, the game results were uploaded to the blockchain network to regulate the cooperative behavior, to ensure the maximization of the overall interests of the supply chain. [Results and Discussions] The research highlighted the significant improvement in agricultural product quality transparency through blockchain traceability technology. However, concerns regarding consumer privacy arising from this traceability could directly impact the pricing, profitability and retailers' decisions to provide blockchain-traceable items. Furthermore, an analysis of the strategic balance between two agricultural product retailers revealed that in situations of low and high product information transparency, both retailers were inclined to simultaneously offer sell traceable products. In such a scenario, blockchain traceability technology enhanced the utility and profitability of retail agricultural products, leading consumers to prefer purchase these traceable products from retailers. In cases where privacy concerns and agricultural product information transparency were both moderate, the initial retailer was more likely to opt for blockchain-based traceable products. This was because consumers had higher trust in the initial retailer, enabling them to bear a higher cost associated with privacy concerns. Conversely, new retailers failed to gain a competitive advantage and eventually exit the market. When consumer privacy concerns exceeded a certain threshold, both competing agricultural retailers discovered that offering blockchain-based traceable products led to a decline in their profits. [Conclusions] When it comes to agricultural product quality and safety, incorporating blockchain technology in traceability significantly improves the transparency of quality-related information for agricultural products. However, it is important to recognize that the application of blockchain for agricultural product traceability is not universally suitable for all agricultural retailers. Retailers must evaluate their unique circumstances and make the most suitable decisions to enhance the effectiveness of agricultural products, drive sales demand, and increase profits. Within the competitive landscape of the agricultural product retail market, nurturing a positive collaborative relationship is essential to maximize mutual benefits and optimize the overall profitability of the agricultural product supply chain.

Key words: blockchain, supply chain, retailers of agricultural products, consumer privacy, game theory

薛冰, 孙传恒, 刘双印, 罗娜, 李金辉. 区块链背景下农产品零售市场价格博弈模型与竞争策略[J]. 智慧农业(中英文), 2024, 6(4): 160-173.

XUE Bing, SUN Chuanheng, LIU Shuangyin, LUO Na, LI Jinhui. Price Game Model and Competitive Strategy of Agricultural Products Retail Market in the Context of Blockchain[J]. Smart Agriculture, 2024, 6(4): 160-173.

图/表 14

表1

博弈模型主要字符含义说明表

字符	字符表示含义
$M 1$ 、 $M 2$	两家零售企业分别为 $M 1$ （已存在）、 $M 2$ （新进入）
v	消费者对 $M 1$ 零售产品的估值
qv	消费者对 $M 2$ 零售产品的估值
k	信息透明度的提升程度
T	消费者承受的隐私关注成本
P	农产品零售商的零售价格
D	消费者需求
$π$	农产品零售商的利润

表1

表2

两家农产品零售商各种决策选择情况下的需求

案例	条件	$D 1$	$D 2$
AA	$p 2 ≤ q p 1$	$1 - p 1 - p 2 1 - q$	$p 1 - p 2 1 - q - p 2 q$
AA	$p 2 > q p 1$	$1 - p 1$	0
BA	$k p 2 ≤ q p 1 + T$	$1 - p 1 + T - p 2 k - p$	$p 1 + T - p 2 k - p - P 2 q$
BA	$k p 2 > q (p 1 + T)$	$1 - (p 1 + T) / k$	0
AB	$k q < 1;$ $p 2 + T ≤ k q p 1$	$1 - p 1 - p 2 - T 1 - k q$	$p 1 - p 2 - T 1 - k q - P 2 + T k q$
	$k q < 1;$ $p 2 + T > k q p 1$	$1 - p 1$	0
	$k q > 1;$ $p 2 + T ≤ k q p 1$	0	$1 - (p 2 + T) / k q$
	$k q > 1;$ $p 2 + T > k q p 1$	$p 2 + T - p 1 k q - 1 - p 1$	$1 - p 2 + T - p 1 k q - 1$
	$k q = 1;$ $p 2 + T ≤ k q p 1$	0	$1 - p 2 + T k q$
	$k q = 1;$ $p 2 + T > k q p 1$	$1 - p 1$	0
BB	$p 2 + T ≤ q (p 1 + T)$	$1 - p 1 - p 2 k (1 - q)$	$p 1 - p 2 k (1 - q) - P 2 + T k q$
BB	$p 2 + T > q (p 1 + T)$	$1 - (p 1 + T) / k$	0

表2

表3

案例AA中零售商的最优定价及相应的需求和利润

零售商	p ^AA	D ^AA	π ^AA
$M 1$	$2 (1 - q) 4 - q$	$2 4 - q$	$4 (1 - q) 4 - q 2$
$M 2$	$q (1 - q) 4 - q$	$1 4 - q$	$q (1 - q) 4 - q 2$

表3

表4

案例BA中零售商的最优策略及相应的需求和利润

零售商		$P B A$	$D B A$	$π B A$
$M 1$	$T ≤$ $2 k (k - q) 2 k - q$	$2 k k - q - T + q T 4 k - q$	$2 k k - q - T + q T (4 k - q) (k - q)$	$2 k k - q - T + q T 2 4 k - q 2 (k - q)$
$M 2$	$T ≤$ $2 k (k - q) 2 k - q$	$q k - q + T 4 k - q$	$k k - q - T (4 k - q) (k - q)$	$k q (k - q + T) 2 4 k - q 2 (k - q)$
$M 1$	$T >$ $2 k (k - q) 2 k - q$	0	0	0
$M 2$	$T >$ $2 k (k - q) 2 k - q$	$q / 2$	$1 / 2$	$q / 2$

表4

图1

表5

案例 AB下零售商的最优策略及其需求和利润

零售商	条件	$p A B$	$D A B$	$π A B$
$M 1$	$T ≤ k q (1 - k q) 2 - k q$ $且 k q < 1$	$2 1 - k q + T 4 - k q$	$2 1 - k q + T (4 - k q) (1 - k q)$	$(2 1 - k q + T) 2 (4 - k q) 2 (1 - k q)$
$M 2$	$T ≤ k q (1 - k q) 2 - k q$ $且 k q < 1$	$k q 1 - k q + T - 2 T 4 - k q$	$k q 1 - k q + T - 2 T k q (4 - k q) (1 - k q)$	$(k q 1 - k q + T - 2 T) 2 k q (4 - k q) 2 (1 - k q)$
$M 1$	$T > k q (1 - k q) 2 - k q$ $且 k q < 1$	$12$	$12$	$14$
$M 2$	$T > k q (1 - k q) 2 - k q$ $且 k q < 1$	（0，1）	0	0
$M 1$	$T ≤ k q (1 - k q) 2 - k q$ $且 k q > 1$	$k q - 1 + T 4 k q - 1$	$k q k q + T - 1 (4 k q - 1) (k q - 1)$	$(k q k q + T - 1) 2 4 k q - 1 2 (k q - 1)$
$M 2$	$T ≤ k q (1 - k q) 2 - k q$ $且 k q > 1$	$2 k q k q - T - 1 + T 4 k q - 1$	$2 k q k q - T - 1 + T (4 k q - 1) (k q - 1)$	$(2 k q k q - T - 1 + T) 2 4 k q - 1 2 (k q - 1)$
$M 1$	$T > k q 1 - k q 2 - k q$ $且 k q > 1$	$12$	$12$	$14$
$M 2$	$T > k q 1 - k q 2 - k q$ $且 k q > 1$	0	0	0
$M 1$	$T < 12$ $且 k q = 1$	$12$	$14$	$18$
$M 2$	$T < 12$ $且 k q = 1$	$12 - T$	$14$	$18 - T 4$
$M 1$	$T ≥ 12$ $且 k q = 1$	$12$	$12$	$14$
$M 2$	$T ≥ 12$ $且 k q = 1$	（0，1）	0	0

表5

图2

表6

案例BB中零售商的最优策略及相应的需求和利润

零售商	条件	$p B B$	$D B B$	$π B B$
$M 1$	$T ≤ k q 2$	$(2 k - T) (1 - q) 4 - q$	$2 k - T k (4 - q)$	$(2 k - T) 2 (1 - q) k (4 - q) 2$
$M 2$	$T ≤ k q 2$	$(k q - 2 T) (1 - q) 4 - q$	$k q - 2 T k q (4 - q)$	$(k q - 2 T) 2 (1 - q) k q (4 - q) 2$
$M 1$	$T > k q 2$	$k - T 2$	$k - T 2 k$	$(k - T) 2 4 k$
$M 2$	$T > k q 2$	（0，1）	0	0

表6

图3

图4

表7

合作博弈均衡策略合约

输入输出

伪代码描述

输入：k值（k>1）、q值（q<1）、零售商 $M 1$ 和零售商 $M 2$ 对应T值（T<=k）

输出：合作博弈均衡策略结果

Begin

T1=根据输入由T1公式（19）计算T1值

T5=根据输入由T5公式（23）计算T1值

if k×q<1

if T<=T5 || ［k>=2/（2‒q）² && k×q/2<T && T<=k‒sqrt（k）］

return“方案BB为均衡策略”

else if ［k>=2/（2‒q）² && T5<T && T<=k×q/2］ || ［k‒sqrt（k）<T && T<=T1］ || ［k<2/（2‒q）² && T5<T && T<=T1］

return“方案BA为均衡策略”

else if ［k>=2/（2‒q）² && T>T1］ || ［k<2/（2‒q）² && T>T1］

return“方案AA为均衡策略”

else if k×q>1

if T<=T5

return“方案BB为均衡策略”

else if T5<T && T<=T1

return“方案BA为均衡策略”

else if T>T1

return“方案AA为均衡策略”

else if k×q=1

if T<=T5

return“方案BB为均衡策略”

else if T5<T && T<=T1

return“方案BA为均衡策略”

else if ｛k<=3/2 && 2×k‒（4×k‒1）/sqrt［8×（k‒1）］<=T && T<（16×k ² ‒16×k+9）/2×（4×k‒1）²｝

return“方案AB为均衡策略”

else if ｛k<=［2+sqrt（3）］/2 && T>=（16×k ²‒16×k+9）/2×（4×k‒1）² || k>［2+sqrt（3）］/2 && T>T1｝

return“方案AA为均衡策略”

return“无法得出均衡策略”

End

表7

图5

图6

图7

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区块链背景下农产品零售市场价格博弈模型与竞争策略

Price Game Model and Competitive Strategy of Agricultural Products Retail Market in the Context of Blockchain

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